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Abstract
Increasing levels of segregation in American schools raises the question: do
home buyers pay for test scores or demographic composition? This paper uses
Connecticut panel data spanning eleven years from 1994 to 2004 to ascertain the
relationship between property values and explanatory variables that include school
district performance and demographic attributes, such as racial and ethnic composition of the student body. Town and census tract fixed effects are included to
control for neighborhood unobservables. The effect of changes in school district
attributes is also examined over a decade long time frame in order to focus on the
effect of long run changes, which are more likely to be capitalized into prices. The
study finds strong evidence that increases in percent Hispanic has a negative effect on housing prices in Connecticut, but mixed evidence concerning the impact
of test scores on property values. Evidence is also found to suggest that student
test scores have increased in importance for explaining housing prices in recent
years while the importance of percent Hispanic has declined. Finally, the study
finds that estimates of property tax capitalization increase substantially when the
analysis focuses on long run changes.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D1, D4, I2, R2, R5.
Keywords: School District Performance, Test Score, Demographics, House
Price, Omitted Neighborhood Attributes. Assessed Value model.
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1. Introduction
The U.S. educational system is characterized by tremendous diversity across school
districts in school performance, socio-economic status, and racial and ethnic composition. The
segregation of students by socio-economics status, race or ethnicity raises concerns about the
extent of equality of opportunity in our society, and these concerns may be increasing in
importance as a number of studies have documented growing levels of segregation in American
public schools, e.g. Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor [13], Reardon and Yun [33], and Frankenburg
and Lee [19].1

Moreover, racial segregation has been shown to be associated with lower

outcomes for minority students (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivken [22], Mickelson [31], Card and
Rothstein [8]) and lower school quality (Freeman, Scafidi, and Sjoquist [20]).
Many cross-sectional studies have examined property values in order to assess the value
people place on the quality of local schools. Typically, property values from samples of housing
transactions are regressed on some measure of school quality, such as standardized test scores.
For example, Taylor [38], Cheshire and Sheppard [9], Weimer and Wolkoff [39], Hayes &
Taylor [24], Bogart and Cromwell [5], and Haurin and Brasington [23] all find a positive
relationship between standardized test scores and housing prices using cross-sectional analyses.2
In addition, a few of these studies examine the effect of socio-economic and demographic
composition of the student body.

For six Louisiana parishes, Norris [32] finds that the

representation of African-Americans in local schools either has no effect or even leads to an
increase in property values. Similarly, Weimer and Wolkoff [39] finds the unexpected result that
the share of students who are eligible for the free-lunch program is associated with higher
property values.
A common concern in studies of school quality capitalization is that school quality may
be correlated with unobserved neighborhood characteristics.

Black [3] examines housing

transactions that occur on the boundary between elementary school attendance zones and finds an
effect of school quality that is 30 to 40 percent smaller than traditional cross-sectional estimates.
Similarly, Leech and Campos [30], Kain, Staiger, and Samms [27], Kain, Staiger, and Riegg [26],
1

Clapp and Ross [10] find that school segregation would have fallen in Connecticut over the 1990’s except
that those declines were offset by the increasing share of minority students in the state.
2
Taylor [38] reviews the literature on the capitalization of school quality into housing price. Ross and
Yinger [37] review the general empirical literature on public service quality and property tax capitalization.
One limitation of this literature is that the price depends upon both supply and demand factors. In order to
truly identify the effect of preferences a full hedonic demand function must be estimated. This has been
made practical in a single market using the nonlinear identifying conditions discussed by Eckland,
Heckman and Nesheim [15]; they generalize Epple [17]. Also, see Bayer, Ferrera, and McMillan [1] for
structural estimates of demand for school attributes. Norris [32] allows for simultaneity in his model but is
forced to rely on troublesome identifying assumptions. In contrast, we rely on the assumption that prices
describe a long-run equilibrium implying that our parameters reveal relationships in this equilibrium. We
support this assumption by examining changes in housing prices over short and long time-frames.
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Gibbons and Machin [21] and Brasington and Haurin [7] also identify the effect of school using
across boundary variation finding comparable positive effects of schools of property values.3
Several papers, Bogart and Cromwell [4], Downes and Zabel [14], Kain, Staiger, and Samms
[27], Kain, Staiger, and Riegg [26], Figlio and Lucas [18], and Reback [34] identify the effect of
school quality on prices using variation across time that allows them to control for neighborhood
quality and other time invariant factors. The results of these studies are mixed with a number of
studies finding little if any impact of student test scores on property values.4 Some of the crosstime studies examine the effect of demographic attributes on prices with Bogart and Cromwell [4]
finding no effect of race on prices while Downes and Zabel [14], Kain, Staiger, and Riegg [26],
and Reback [34] finding that changes in demographic attributes are important.5
This paper examines the effect of school district performance as measured by student test
scores and the effect of the student socio-economic and demographic composition on local
property values using a panel of housing transactions in the state of Connecticut between 1994
and 2004. We identify the effect of school attributes separately from neighborhood quality by
including school district or neighborhood (census tracts) fixed effects exploiting the cross time
variation available in the panel.6 This decision is primarily driven by the nature of our data
relative to other papers that have used the boundary approach. Most studies that use variation
across boundaries had detailed information on school attendance zone while our study, like many
of the other cross-time studies, has information at the school district level where boundaries are
less likely to divide homogenous neighborhoods.

3

Further, in Connecticut, school districts

Gibbons and Machin [21] and Brasington and Haurin [7] control for neighborhood quality using a spatial
smoother, which retains the discontinuous effect of schools on prices across boundaries, implicitly
identifying their models off of price variation across boundaries. Gibbons and Machin also instrument for
school quality using lagged values and find much larger effects of school quality on price in their IV
models. Similarly, Rosenthal [35] instruments for school quality using the recent occurrence of an external
inspection as an instrument, but finds substantially smaller effects than either Black or Gibbons and
Machin. Also, see Bayer, Ferrera, and McMillan [1] for a structural model that uses both school district
boundary effects and traditional IV approaches to separately identify preferences for school and
neighborhood attributes.
4
Many of the cross-time studies exploit policy variation, such as a redistricting (Bogart and Cromwell [4],
Kain, Staiger, and Riegg [26]), introduction of a system of school choice (Reback [34]), and introduction or
release of school report cards (Kain, Staiger, and Samms [27], Figlio and Lucas [18]). However, the
specific impact of test scores on housing prices, when estimated, is often identified using cross-time
variation in the panel.
5
Clotfelter [12] found that racial composition of schools was important for explaining changes in housing
prices in the south following school desegregation orders.
6
Many of the cross-time variation papers above control for fixed effects using a repeats sales approach.
Given that our measures of school quality and demographics do not vary within school districts, however,
the correlation of these variables with omitted, time-invariant town, neighborhood, and housing unit
attributes should be eliminated by simply controlling for district fixed effects. Moreover, a number of
papers have raised concerns that repeat sales analyses may be inconsistent due to selection bias arising
from the requirement that a unit sell two or more times during the sample period (Kiel and Zabel [28],
Clapp, Giaccotto and Tirtiroglu [11]).
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boundaries share boundaries with towns exacerbating concerns that houses on either side of a
boundary belong to quite different neighborhoods.
Two significant concerns arise when using cross-time variation to identify the effect of
town or school district attributes on housing prices. First, the elimination of fixed effect typically
reduces the variation arising from unobservables thereby increasing the relative importance of
any measurement error in the data, see Kain and Staiger [25] regarding school test scores.
Second, short-term fluctuations in district attributes may not represent permanent changes and as
such may not be fully capitalized into housing prices, see Yinger, Bloom, Borsch-Supan, and
Ladd [40] concerning property taxes. In order to address the first concern, we follow Gibbons
and Machin [21] and Kain, Staiger, and Samms [27] using three-year moving averages of district
attributes. Finally, we estimate a series of long-run models comparing changes in housing prices
and district attributes over seven, eight, nine and ten year periods.
In our neighborhood fixed effect analysis, we find statistically significant, but very small
effects, of test scores on property values with a one standard deviation increase in test scores
leading to one and a third percent increase in property values.7

While our findings are

substantially smaller than the two and half percent effect in Black [3], the results confirm Black’s
finding that failing to control for neighborhood unobservables leads to an overstatement of the
effect of test scores on property values, which is important given recent concerns that
capitalization may be lower near boundaries due to the possibility of future boundary changes
(Cheshire & Sheppard [9]).8 We find a substantial negative effect of percent African-American
and percent Hispanic with a 10 percentage point increase in these variables leading to a three and
a half and three percent decline in property values, respectively. When moving averages of
district attributes are used, the effects of math score and percent African-American on housing
prices decline in magnitude, and the effect of a 10 percentage point increase in the Hispanic
students increases to over 4 percent.
7

It is important to distinguish between our analysis that examines the impact of test scores after controlling
for student demographics, and studies that develop and control for a measure of school or school district
value-added, such as Downes and Zabel [14], Kain, Staiger, and Samms [27], Kain, Staiger, and Riegg
[26], Taylor [38], and Brasington and Haurin [7]. School district value-added is intended to capture the
contribution of the school to student performance by examining changes in test scores or by controlling for
the expected performance of the student body. The failure to find a relationship between value-added
measures of school quality and housing prices does not imply that homeowners ignore school quality, but
rather that the intrinsic attributes of the school’s student body is the most important determinant of school
quality as opposed to educational inputs. Alternatively, in our model, we attempt to test whether
homebuyers respond most to average test scores, which of course captures the quality of the student body,
or to demographic composition.
8
Cheshire & Sheppard [9] argue that Black’s [3] findings may not be the result of omitted neighborhood
variables, but rather that attendance zones may change over time and as a result parents along zone
boundaries may pay a smaller premium for school quality differences due to the possibility of being
redistricted into the other school. Cheshire and Sheppard [9] and Brasington [6] provide evidence that
capitalization is lower in areas where housing supply is expanding or more elastic.
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In our long-run analyses, the negative effect of percent Hispanic increases in importance
with a 10 percentage point increase leading to between a five and ten percent decline in prices
with the largest changes arising in the models covering the longest time frame, but the negative
effect of percent African-American is not robust. The negative impact of property taxes on
housing values is substantially larger in the long-run analyses increasing from 37 percent to
between 56 and 63 percent of the present value of future taxes being capitalized into property
values. The effect of test scores appears sensitive to the time frame with test scores being
positive and statistically significant for the shortest time frame. This sensitivity led us to explore
whether the effect of test scores and percent Hispanic on property values is changing over time,
and we found strong evidence that the influence of percent Hispanic is weakening over time and
some evidence that the importance of test scores is increasing.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II covers the methodology;
Section III describes the data; and Section IV presents the findings.

Finally, Section V

summarizes and discusses the major findings.

2. Methodology
The hedonic function9 for the price (Pijkt) of house i in neighborhood j in school district k
at time t can be defined as follows:
ln(Pijkt) = α + δZkt + ωt + Γijk + εijkt

(1)

where Zkt are the year-specific school district attributes, which includes school district
performance as measured by standard test scores, socio-economic and demographic composition
of the students, and the local property tax rate, ωt represents variation in market prices over time,

Γijk is a term that captures time-invariant attributes of the housing unit including attributes of the
unit’s neighborhood and school district, and εijkt is a time-variant unobservable that is assumed to
be randomly distributed and uncorrelated with Zkt, ωt, and Γijk.
Heterogeneity over time in terms of market conditions (ωt) and across units (Γijk) are
primarily addressed by a large number of fixed effects. In the case of market heterogeneity, the
level, trends, and seasonality in housing prices are allowed to vary across market. Specifically,
the state is divided into labor market areas that represent metropolitan style housing markets, and
year and month fixed effects are included for every labor market area. Given that our primary
variables of interest are at the school district level, any correlation between district level variables
9

This semi-log specification is standard in the literature.
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(Zkt) and unit unobservables (Γijk) can be eliminated and consistent estimates obtained by the
inclusion of district level fixed effects. Specifically, Γijk is written as a linear function of housing
unit (Xi) and neighborhood (Wj) attributes and district fixed effects (νk).

Γijk = βXi + µ Wj + ν k

(2)

Combining equation (1) and equation (3), we obtain:
ln(Pijkt) = α + δZkt + ωt + βXi + µ Wj+ν k + εijkt

(3)

Equation (3) is the district fixed effect model. This specification is closest to one in Black (1999)
because it should eliminate any correlation between school performance at the specific scale
measured and average neighborhood quality at that scale.
Unlike Black [3], however, our analysis is at the school district level, and the effect of
schools may be identified by comparing sales that occurred in different neighborhoods within the
same school district. If neighborhood quality varies substantially within districts, a comparison
of transaction prices that does not control for the neighborhood unobservable will have higher
variance and is likely to provide estimates with larger standard errors. This problem can be
addressed by including a full set of neighborhood fixed effects (σj)10 and estimating
ln(Pijkt) = α + δZkt + ωt + βXi + σj + εijkt

(4)

The models in equations (3) and (4) are estimated for a series annual transaction samples that are
pooled over time, and accordingly transactions can be observed in the same school district or
neighborhood (census tract) at different times and therefore with different district attributes.
In addition, we estimate models that use three-year moving averages of school district
attributes in order to address concerns that district attributes may be measured with error.
Specifically,
ln(Pijkt) = α + δ Z kt + ωt + βXi + σj + εijkt
10

(5)

Note that the school district/town fixed effects (νk) are subsumed into the neighborhood fixed effects (σj)
because census tracts do not to cross town/district boundaries in Connecticut. Given that our measures of
school quality and demographics do not vary across neighborhoods within a school district, these district
variables should be uncorrelated with omitted, time-invariant neighborhood attributes, and both the town
and tract analyses should be consistent. As noted in the text, however, the tract fixed effect analysis is
likely to yield more precise estimates.
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where Z kt is the average of Zkt-1, Zkt, and Zkt+1.
The long-run models are estimated by forming pairs of two years, t and t+d, where t is
the a sample year and d is the period between early and later years in the pair, pooling samples of
transactions based on all relevant pairs of years, and including year-pair specific
neighborhood/tract fixed effects. These models are also estimated using equation (5) except that
fixed effect is designated by t to be pair specific and so the coefficients on district attributes (δ)
are only identified based on changes in attributes and prices that occurred over d years.
ln(Pijkt) = α + δ Z kt + ωt + βXi + σjt + εijkt

(6)

ln(Pijkt+d) = α + δ Z kt +d + ωt+d + βXi + σjt + εijkt+d

Clearly, an identification strategy based on across time variation is not perfect in that
fixed effects cannot control for unobservable changes in neighborhood quality at the level of the
town or census tract. However, the strategy provides a tractable and reasonable approach for
identifying the effect of school quality and demographic attributes separately from neighborhood
quality. Further, an across time approach is complementary to identification strategies based on
boundaries in that the two approaches have very different strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, in terms of inference, standard errors are based on clustering at the district-year
level for all models. Unlike a traditional panel where the inclusion of district or tract fixed effects
will eliminate within group (district) correlation, our sample contains many observations for the
same district and transaction year, and our district attributes are aggregated at this level. The
correlation between transactions that occurred in the same district and year will bias traditional
standard error estimates upwards and clustering at this level of aggregation is the appropriate
response.11

11

The need to cluster at the district-year level raises concerns because we are then unable to cluster across
time. Bertrand, Duflow, and Mullainathan [2] argue that standard errors in fixed effect models are biased
by heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and Kezdi [29] demonstrates using simulations that clustered
standard errors are suitable for use with autocorrelated and heteroscedastic panel data. We have estimated
standard errors clustered at the tract level, and these errors are smaller than the district-year clustered errors
so the district-year clustering is used to be conservative. Further, the long-run analysis is based on
comparisons between transactions at the beginning and the end of a period, which is comparable to the
before and after approach suggested by Bertrand, Duflow, and Mullainathan [2] for obtaining consistent
estimates of standard errors. We have not found any evidence to suggest that autocorrelation in our data
creates substantial bias in the standard errors.

7

3. Data Description and Summary Statistics
This study used a sample of sales of owner-occupied properties with one to four units12
spanning over eleven years from 1994 to 2004; the data are purchased from Banker and
Tradesman for the state of Connecticut. The sample has 356,829 transactions for one to four unit
owner-occupied structures after any filtering to eliminate invalid or nonrepresentative
transactions. This data set contains information about the unit address, selling price, assessed
value and sales date, as well as the detailed listing of the unit characteristics such as internal
square footage, number of rooms, bedrooms, bathrooms, building age and lot size.13 Table 1
shows the data filters imposed in order to eliminate observations that appear to contain spurious
and unreliable information. Observations are not deleted when information on unit characteristics
are missing. Rather, dummy variables are included in the specification to allow for a unique
intercept for all observations missing the same attribute or set of attributes.
Table 2 gives the summary statistics over all years of the variables that enter into
regression analysis. The house sales price is shown under the dependent variable heading. The
average sales price over the period is $235K based on 1994 prices, but with a very high standard
deviation of 322K. Further, inflation adjusted prices grew at an average of 5.4 percent per year.
Variables under the heading Hedonic/housing attributes, indicate the average number of rooms
(6.7), bedrooms (2.4), bathrooms (2.0), age of the unit (42 years), and internal square footage
(1,698). The Town/School district characteristics panel shows the transaction sample average of
th

the standardized 8th grade mathematics, reading and writing scores. We focus on 8 grade test

score because most towns in Connecticut have only one middle school/junior high
providing a measure of district performance that is uniform across all houses in most
towns.14 The district average mathematics test score is standardized for the state by year in order
to address the general upward trends in test scores during the last decade.

12

15

Within town

We include single-family, two-family, three-family, and residential condominiums. We compare results
from the estimation with the sample that excludes the residential condominiums, an exclusion of about
13,500 transactions. Results are robust to the exclusion of condominiums. Note that for many years our
data does not distinguish between single-family units and multi-family units with four or less units.
Hedonic models that use only later years where single-family units can be identified do not appear to be
affected by the elimination of small multi-family units from the sample.
13
Some observations have missing information on one or more housing attribute. These observations are
retained in the sample and dummy variables are included to control for the fact that a specific attribute is
missing.
14
Key results are robust to dropping the large central city districts, which tend to have multiple,
heterogeneous schools that educate 8th graders.
15
All core findings are robust to alternative approaches for standardizing test scores, as well as being robust
to the use of standardized reading or writing test scores.
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variation in standardized test scores over time represents changes in the position of a district
relative to the distribution of district test scores across the state. The mean is negative capturing
the fact that larger central city districts with lower test scores have more housing transactions than
individual, smaller suburban towns, and the standard errors are above one capturing across time
variation test scores. The sample average of the proportion of students qualifying for the free
lunch program is 22.5 percent, proportion of non-English speaking students (NEHL) is 11.6
percent, proportion of students who are African-American is 12.4 percent, and proportion
Hispanic is 11.5 percent. All four groups have increased representation over time of between two
and three percent per year except for Hispanics who have a seven percent population growth rate
per year.16
The property tax rate (“mill rate”) for each town/school district in each year was obtained
from State of Connecticut's Office of Policy Management. The statutory mill rate does not

represent the effective tax rate in the town because properties in Connecticut are only
reassessed every decade and the reassessment year varies across towns. An effective or
equalized property tax rate (EPTR) is generated based on the logic that the actual
property tax burden will be substantially below the statutory rate when a town’s
properties have assessed values that are well below the properties’ market values.
Specifically, EPTR in a town for a given year is calculated by multiplying the town’s
statutory mill rate times the average of the ratio of assessed value to sales price for all
units sold in that town during the year. Average statutory property tax rate is $31 per $1000
of assessed house value. The average ratio of assessed value to sales price is about 72% leading
to an average effective tax rate in the state of just over 2% of market value.

The actual variable included in the regressions uses a standard function form for
approximating the present value of property taxes per dollar of property value given that
effective tax rates are expected to remain the same or
PV of Property Taxes = log [r + EPTR/1000]

(7)

see Yinger, Bloom, Borsch-Supan, and Ladd [40]. The discount rate r is assumed to be
0.03, which is fairly standard in the literature. The estimated coefficient on this variable
captures the share of property tax burden that is capitalized into the house price. It

16

All averages are taken over the sample of units, which disproportionately represents tracts that contain a
large number of owner-occupied housing units and tracts in which such units sell more frequently.
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should be noted that the estimate of property tax capitalization varies monotonically with
the discount rate assumption.
This study uses the census tract as a proxy for neighborhood.17 Neighborhood fixedeffects are defined based on the 838 tracts in the State of Connecticut during the 1990 Decennial
Census. The 1990 census is used to obtain median family income, proportion of AfricanAmericans in tract, proportion of Hispanics in tract, proportion of owner occupied units in tract,
and proportion of married couple with children in each tract. The census tract attributes are used
as control variables in the simple pooled cross-sectional analysis, as well as the town fixed effects
analysis. Census tract control variables are held constant over time, rather than using a weighted
average between 1990 and 2000 censuses, in order to be consistent with the neighborhood fixed
effect specifications, which control for time-invariant aspects of neighborhood quality. The
estimates for district variables, however, do not appear to be sensitive to use of time varying
census tract attributes.
Finally, the specification includes both year and month fixed effects based on the sales
date in the housing transaction record. Separate year and month fixed effects are estimated for
each market or region in the state in order to account for the possibility that housing price
appreciation varied regionally. The 10 Labor Market Areas (LMA’s) in Connecticut are used to
define markets or regions. LMAs are collections of towns defined by the State Department of
Labor and are conceptually similar to the U.S. Census defined Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs).18

4. Results
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for our baseline models. The first column shows
the traditional hedonic regression results where we do not control for the town or tract fixed
effects, a pooled cross-sectional analysis. The second and third columns present the hedonic
estimation after controlling for the town fixed effects and tract fixed effects, respectively. We
have included the physical unit characteristics,19 town/district characteristics, and in the first two

17

Alternatively, census block groups might be used as a definition of neighborhood, but the transaction
data begins to get quite thin at that level of disaggregation.
18
LMA has some key advantages over MSA: a. the areas are consistent with town boundaries. b. LMA
provides complete coverage of all towns within the state, and c. LMA is defined at a smaller scale and so,
better representative of commuting and residential patterns in a small and densely populated state like
Connecticut.
19
To capture the non-linearity in Internal Square Footage, we have used a spline or piecewise variable. We
selected to put the ‘knot’ at 2500 sq.ft.
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models neighborhood or census tract characteristics.20 The coefficient estimates on the physical
unit characteristics are all reasonable and very robust across the three specifications.21
On the other hand, the estimated effects of school district attributes are much more
sensitive to the specification. As found by Black [3], the effect of test scores in a model that only
controls for neighborhood observables (the hedonic baseline) is substantially overstated relative
to fixed effects models. Specifically, in the OLS model, the effect of a one standard deviation
increase in math score on property value is 7.4 percent while the fixed effect models indicate only
a 1.4 or 1.3 percent effect. While small, this effect is statistically significant in the census tract
fixed effect model due to the smaller standard errors in that model. These estimates can be
compared to Black’s [3] estimate of approximately 2.5 percent based on a one standard deviation
change in test scores near Boston, and Gibbons and Machin’s [21] finding of a 1.8 percent effect
for London, which they estimated specifically for comparison with Black’s earlier estimate.22
While noticeably smaller, our estimates are based on an identification strategy that does not focus
on housing units near boundaries, and we confirm Black’s finding that ignoring neighborhood
unobservables leads to a substantial overstatement of the effect school quality on property values.
This confirmation is significant given Cheshire and Sheppard’s [9] argument that Black’s finding
may have arisen from uncertainty concerning the future location of boundaries rather than from
the inclusion of neighborhood effects. All models are re-estimated using reading and writing test
scores, and the results are very similar.
Returning to Table 3, the OLS estimates indicate counter-intuitive, positive effects of
percent of students who are non-English speakers and African-American on property values,
which are consistent with earlier cross sectional studies by Norris [32] and Weimer & Wolkoff
[39]. The fixed effect models, however, suggest that both higher percent African-American and
higher percent Hispanic students in a district leads to lower property values in Connecticut.
Specifically, the census tract fixed effect models imply that a one percent increase in percent of
students African-American or Hispanic leads to a decrease in property values of 0.36 and 0.31
percent, respectively. These tract fixed effect estimates of demographic effects are comparable in
magnitude to findings by to Brasington and Haurin [7], Downes and Zabel [14], and Kain,
Staiger, and Riegg [26]. The estimated effects are smaller and insignificant in the less efficient
district fixed effect estimates, but the two sets of estimates, town and tract fixed effects, cannot be

20

We include school spending in some models. It is typically insignificant, generates very unstable
estimates and does not affect any of the other estimation results.
21
This finding is supportive of the idea that there are no substantial omitted housing attributes that vary
systematically across neighborhoods. If omitted attributes vary systematically across towns, the attributes
would be expected to be correlated with observed variables like square footage and number of bedrooms,
22
The Gibbons and Machin [21] effect is based on a five percent change in test scores, which was a one
standard deviation change in Black [3]. Gibbons and Machin did not provide information on the variation
in test scores over their sample.
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distinguished from each other statistically. Finally, approximately 30 percent of the property tax
obligations are capitalized into housing prices in both the town and tract fixed effect models,
which is also consistent with the existing literature.
Table 4 revisits the models in Table 3 using a three year moving average of test scores,
district demographic variables, and property tax in order to address concerns about measurement
error in these attributes. Focusing on the tract fixed effect model, the estimated effect of test
scores and percent of students African-American are relatively unchanged falling from 0.013 and
-0.36 to 0.011 and –0.32, respectively. The effect of percent of students Hispanic and property
taxes, however, increases in magnitude from -0.31 and -0.30 to –0.43 and –0.37, respectively.
These results suggest that in our sample the impact of measurement error is most important for
demographic and property tax variables as opposed to standardized test scores.

4.1. Long-Run Effect of School Attributes
Table 5 estimates long-run models that are similar to the tract fixed effect models with
moving average district attributes above using transactions drawn from pairs of years that are
separated by a specific number of years. Specifically, the four columns in the table present the
results for models estimated using the only 10 year sample (1994 paired with 2004); the two 9
year samples (1994 and 1995 paired with 2003 and 2004, respectively) stacked into one
regression; the three eight year samples; and the four seven year samples. These models include
tract-pair of years fixed effects assuring that the influence of district attributes are captured based
on changes in prices over the indicated time periods.23
The analysis finds robust negative effects of percent Hispanic and property taxes.
Specifically, the effect of Hispanics increases from -0.43 with yearly data to between –0.96 and
–0.53 for the seven to ten year periods, meaning that a one percentage point change in Hispanic
students is associated with a decline of between one-half and one percent in house prices. For the
effective property tax variable defined by equation (6), the effect of a one percent change
increases from -.37 percent with yearly data to between –0.63 and –0.56 percent in Table 5. The
effect for percent African-American is not robust with statistically insignificant estimates for the
longest time frame of ten years and reversing sign for a significant positive effect for shorter time
frames. The effect of test scores is equally ambiguous with statistically insignificant results
except for the shortest time frame of seven years and a clear monotonic relationship between the
length of the time frame considered and the value of the test score coefficient. The reader should
23

As in the short-run models, the errors are clustered at the district-year level because district attributes are
aggregated at that level. The resulting standard errors are larger than those arising from a model where
errors are cluster at the tract level.
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note that the pooled results in Tables 3 and 4 are based on transaction comparisons over both
short periods of a couple years and long periods of nine or ten years so that the effective time
frame for Tables 3 and 4 is more comparable to the seven year time frame in Table 5 than to the
other samples representing longer time frames.24

4.2. Has the Effect of Key District Attributes Changed over Time?
However, the sensitivity of the test score and percent Hispanic student results to changes
in the time frame raises questions about whether the property value effects are constant over time.
Table 6 presents an additional analysis where both the math test score and the fraction Hispanic
students variables are interacted with a year of transaction variable running form zero to ten for
both the full sample from Table 4 and the eight and seven year time frame samples from Table
5.25 The effect of percent Hispanic is above 0.90 and similar to the estimates for the longest time
frames in Table 5 for all three samples, but the effect declines in magnitude over time and after
10 years the negative effect of percent Hispanic is estimated to be between -0.52 and –0.71. The
level effect of test scores is near zero and insignificant, but for the eight and seven year time
frame samples the interaction is positive and statistically significant so that the estimated effect
size after ten years is between 2 and 4 percentage points for a one standard deviation change in
test scores.

5. Conclusions
This paper uses a panel of school districts to examine the effects of school district test
scores and demographic composition on housing prices after controlling for the influence of
unobserved neighborhood attributes with fixed effects. In general, we find that people in the state
of Connecticut during the study period seem to be more concerned about the changes in
demographic attributes particularly percent Hispanic students than the changes in test scores
when deciding how much to pay for homes. These findings do not necessarily imply that people
were indifferent concerning school quality and test scores at the beginning of our sample period.
Rather, the findings may reflect the fact that people make judgments about school quality using
easily available signals. For example, people may rely on word of mouth recommendations and
general reputation, which may not reflect substantial changes in school quality as captured by

24

We also estimated results for shorter time frames and found results similar to the seven year time frame
shown in the fourth column.
25
The reader should note that the level effect of the transaction year time trend is captured by a series of
fixed effects that are included in all model specifications and were described earlier in the paper.
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changes in test scores over time. Further, the ethnicity of the student body in a school district is
easily observable and in Connecticut highly correlated with test scores both in a cross-section and
in changes. Therefore, school ethnic composition may provide homebuyers with a useful signal
concerning school quality.26
However, we find evidence that this pattern has been changing over time with the effect
of Hispanic students declining and an increased importance being placed on test scores. These
changes may reflect a decline in bias against Hispanics over the decade consistent with general
patterns of declining discrimination in housing markets (Ross and Turner [36]). Alternatively,
these changes may reflect a more general public awareness of readily available information on
school test scores along with possibly greater saliency of test scores following the passage of the
federal “No Child Left Behind” Act of 2001.
Our analysis also confirms earlier findings by Black [3] that cross-sectional studies that
do not control for unobservable components of neighborhood quality overstate the influence of
test scores on property values. This confirmation is important because Cheshire and Sheppard [9]
have offered an alternative explanation for Black’s findings; namely that capitalization may be
lower along boundaries because homeowners near the boundary may face more uncertainty
arising from possible boundary adjustments in the future. While our identification strategy has its
own inherent weaknesses, it is useful to confirm the importance of neighborhood unobservables
in a model that does not rely on variation across boundaries.
Finally, our long-run analysis indicates that property tax capitalization may be
understated in models that focus on year-to-year variation in property tax mill rates. Specifically,
capitalization rates rise from around 30 percent to estimates between 56 and 63 percent when
considered over a longer time frame. These results confirm an observation of Yinger, Bloom,
Borsch-Supan, and Ladd [40] that existing studies may understate the true level of capitalization
because households only respond to property tax differences when they expect those differences
to persist.
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This interpretation of the Hispanic results in our paper would be consistent with recent work on
residential segregation, which suggests that white households do not explicitly care about race, but rather
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Table 1 Data Filters
Items

Number of Observations

Raw Data Set (with usage equal to Single-Family, Two-Family, ThreeFamily, Condominiums, Residential Dwelling 1-3 units and no missing

401,338

tract information)
Missing town identifier

less:

2,211

less:

7,099

less:

6,829

House Sales Price < $10,000

less:

2,798

Assessed Value < $10,000

less:

2,538

less:

30,133

Missing town attributes
Price per square foot,
Ratio of Sales price and assessed value beyond 3 std. Dev. Limit

Internal Square Footage <= 400 sft,
Number of Bedrooms > Number of Rooms,
Units built before year 1600,
Unit Age > 100 years
Regression Sample

349,730
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Table 2 Summary Statistics: All Years
Variable (Description)

Growth Rate
(1994-2004)

Mean

Std. Dev.

5.40

235.417

322.321

Number of Rooms

6.719

2.345

Number of Bedrooms

2.438

1.656

Number of Bathrooms

1.974

0.881

Age of the Building in100s of years

0.424

0.241

Internal Square Footage in 1000s

1.698

1.029

-0.413

1.309

Price Variables:
House Sales Price in $1,000 ; tax and inflation adj. to 1994
prices
Hedonic/Housing Attributes:

Town/School District Attributes:
Average Math Exam Score
Fraction of Students qualifying for the Free Lunch Program

2.01

0.225

0.222

Fraction of Non-English speaking students

3.30

0.116

0.135

Fraction of African-American Students

3.09

0.124

0.154

Fraction of Hispanic Students

7.34

0.115

0.137

31.472

12.078

Median Family Income in 10,000s

5.570

1.968

Fraction of Blacks in Tract

0.057

0.118

Fraction of Hispanics in Tract

0.041

0.069

Fraction of Owner-occupied Units in Tract

0.723

0.195

Fraction of Married couples with Children in Tract

0.322

0.044

Effective Property Tax Rate per $1,000, EPTR/1000 in eqn. (7)
Tract or Neighborhood Attributes:
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Table 3 Math Score
Controls

OLS

Town FE

Number of Rooms

0.024
(10.07)

0.023
(9.97)

Census Tract
FE
0.023
(10.79)

Number of Bedrooms

0.015
(4.75)

0.014
(4.66)

0.013
(4.56)

Age in 100s

-0.817
(-20.69)

-0.874
(-23.52)

-0.883
(-25.56)

(Age in 100s)2

0.411
(10.49)

0.429
(11.54)

0.433
(12.74)

Log(square footage<2,500sft)

0.480
(32.97)

0.490
(34.85)

0.476
(36.01)

Log(square footage>=2,500sft)

0.076
(2.40)

0.057
(1.87)

0.070
(2.25)

Math Test Score

0.074
(8.99)

0.014
(2.53)

0.013
(2.45)

Fraction Student enrolled in Free Lunch program

-0.363
(-6.19)

0.049
(0.75)

0.019
(0.31)

Fraction Student Non-English Speakers

0.419
(4.93)

0.165
(1.24)

0.085
(0.79)

Fraction Student African-American

0.279
(6.64)

-0.152
(-0.77)

-0.364
(-3.81)

Fraction Student Hispanics

0.128
(1.22)

-0.136
(-0.66)

-0.308
(-1.90)

Effective Property Tax Rate

-0.531
(-11.49)

-0.305
(-8.30)

-0.299
(-8.69)

Median Family Income in Tract

0.086
(24.56)

0.063
(20.43)

Fraction African-American Persons in Tract

-0.265
(-8.89)

-0.391
(-14.61)

Fraction Hispanic Persons in Tract

-0.295
(-3.91)

-0.464
(-6.53)

Fraction Owner-occupied units in Tract

-0.011
(-0.50)

0.030
(1.61)

Fraction Married Couple with Children in Tract

-0.866
(-13.08)

-0.503
(-8.79)

0.702

0.718

2

R

349,730

N
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Table 4 Math Score, Moving Average
Controls

OLS

Town FE

Math Test Score

0.091
(9.65)

0.009
(0.89)

Census Tract
FE
0.011
(1.07)

Fraction Student enrolled in Free Lunch program

-0.349
(-5.80)

0.121
(1.13)

0.072
(0.71)

Fraction Student Non-English Speakers

0.419
(5.06)

0.191
(1.01)

0.075
(0.55)

Fraction Student African-American

0.344
(8.16)

-0.138
(-0.67)

-0.323
(-3.17)

Fraction Student Hispanics

0.225
(2.13)

-0.353
(-1.49)

-0.428
(-2.10)

Effective Property Tax Rate

-0.582
(-11.06)

-0.374
(-7.78)

-0.374
(-8.16)

0.703

0.718

0.733

2

R

349,730

N

Table 5 Math Score, Moving Average, Sub-Samples
Controls

1994 & 2004

1994 & 2003
1995 & 2004

1994 & 2002
1995 & 2003
1996 & 2004

1994 & 2001
1995 & 2002
1996 & 2003
1997 & 2004

Math Test Score

-0.023
(-1.32)

0.006
(0.46)

0.016
(1.48)

0.032
(3.45)

Fraction Student enrolled in Free Lunch program

-0.128
(-0.77)

-0.245
(-1.97)

-0.172
(-2.16)

-0.157
(-1.87)

Fraction Student Non-English Speakers

-0.162
(-1.03)

0.128
(1.10)

0.036
(0.22)

-0.008
(-0.05)

Fraction Student African-American

0.191
(1.07)

0.423
(3.37)

0.262
(2.73)

0.167
(2.01)

Fraction Student Hispanics

-0.945
(-3.09)

-0.959
(-4.32)

-0.771
(-3.76)

-0.531
(-2.74)

Effective Property Tax Rate

-0.627
(-12.60)

-0.584
(-15.80)

-0.559
(-15.46)

-0.601
(-13.15)

0.767

0.761

0.756

0.752

63,906

127,166

189,619

257,327

2

R
N
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Table 6 Math Score, Moving Average, Paired Sub-Samples
Controls

Full Sample

1994 & 2002
1995 & 2003
1996 & 2004

Math Test Score

-0.001
(-0.07)

-0.005
(-0.37)

1994 & 2001
1995 & 2002
1996 & 2003
1997 & 2004
0.006
(0.54)

Math Test Score interacted with Transaction Year

0.001
(1.02)

0.002
(2.54)

0.003
(2.84)

Fraction Student enrolled in Free Lunch program

-0.043
(-0.49)

-0.229
(-2.72)

-0.265
(-3.24)

Fraction Student Non-English Speakers

0.261
(1.95)

0.146
(0.87)

0.162
(1.20)

Fraction Student African-American

-0.165
(-1.66)

0.273
(2.70)

0.216
(2.48)

Fraction Student Hispanic

-0.934
(-4.52)

-0.981
(-4.60)

-0.914
(-4.69)

Fraction Hispanic interacted with Transaction Year

0.038
(4.20)

0.027
(3.37)

0.039
(5.03)

Effective Property Tax Rate

-0.322
(-6.87)

-0.552
(-11.81)

-0.561
(-12.42)

0.733

0.756

0.752

349,730

189,619

257,327

2

R
N

Notes to Table 3: the dependent variable is the natural log of transactions price, lnPijkt of house i in
neighborhood j in school district k at time t ; t-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are based on townyear clustering.
Notes to Table 4: the dependent is the natural log of transactions price, lnPijkt of house i in neighborhood j
in school district k at time t ; t-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are based on town-year clustering.
Explanatory variables are three year moving averages: Z kt is the average of Zkt, Zkt+1, and Zkt+2.
Notes to Table 5: These are tract fixed effect regressions for the pairs of years listed; the fixed effect
dummy is specific to each tract and pair of years listed so as to identify parameters from changes over the
indicated time frame. Pairs of years are pooled.
Notes to Table 6: Math Test Score and Fraction Student Hispanic have been interacted with a linear time
trend based on transaction year. These two variables were selected because of the variation in their
coefficients in Tables 3, 4 and 5.

22

